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The Matter of Britain: 






The United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a composite state 
made up of  at least four distinct cultural entities. Recently these entities have gained 
more political autonomy, and regional national identities have become more signifi cant 
compared with the collective ‘British’ identity. Does this presage an end to the 300-year 
political Union? While Scotland, Wales and Ireland have strong national identities, Eng-
land is less well defi ned, and this poses a problem for those who wish to resolve the 
matter to the benefi t of  all. Is it possible to have multiple national/political loyalties? If  
















This paper is principally concerned with investigating contemporary cultural 
aspects of  the United Kingdom in the light of  claims that it is disintegrating 
into separate homogeneous cultural entities. Although the focus is cultural, 
some explication of  the political background must also be presented.
The point of  departure is a debate which has been conducted, in various 
forms, for at least thirty years, but which has intensifi ed recently with the 
establishment of  political assemblies in both Scotland and Wales. The prac-
tical dimension here is the question of  whether the United Kingdom will 
indeed fragment into independent nation-states. There is also a theoretical 
dimension: whether such fragmentation is an inevitable consequence of  any 
political union involving disparate cultures. The practical question will be 
tentatively addressed, but it is the theoretical dimension which has the most 
universal relevance.
Background
The history of  the formation of  the United Kingdom is complex. Unlike
most other European nations, the nations of  England, Scotland, Ireland and 
Wales have long histories, coalescing from smaller kingdoms in the fi rst mil-
lennium.
England was formed from pre-existing kingdoms such as Wessex, Nor-
thumbria and Mercia. Wessex was dominant, and the fi rst use of  the title 
‘King of  England’ was by Alfred the Great, King of  Wessex (871―899). The 
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other kingdoms were absorbed into England, and effectively disappeared, 
save for their contribution to regional names. For example, Northumbria 
gave its name to Northumberland. The pre-existing kingdoms resulted from 
the island’s turbulent history, and the invasion of  Roman Britain by succes-
sive waves of  invaders. They represented a diversity of  cultures and lan-
guage groups, including Saxons, Angles, Jutes, Vikings, Danes and others.
Wales lost its independence early, after conquest by William of  Norman-
dy in 1066, but rather than being absorbed into England, it retained its iden-
tity as a ‘principality’. Ireland was also subjugated by Normans, but retained 
a far greater measure of  independence for many years.
Key events in the formation of  the United Kingdom were the acces-
sion of  James VI of  Scotland (James I of  England) to the English throne in 
1603, effectively uniting the two kingdoms, and the Act of  Union of  1707, 
which formalized the arrangement. What is frequently forgotten about the 
latter agreement is the extent to which it preserved separate Scottish insti-
tutions, most of  which have survived to the present day. While separation 
of  institutions is often cited as evidence of  incipient fracture, it is worth 
remembering that Scotland retained its own legal, religious and educational 
systems from the very start of  the Union.
Less seriously from a political view, though perhaps more signifi cant cul-
turally, the nations of  the United Kingdom have always retained their own 
football teams. Even the prospect that a ‘United Kingdom’ football team, 
combining the strength of  the four constituent nations, might be able to win 
the World Cup, is not enough to persuade those involved to abandon their 
national loyalties to a common cause.
The viability of  the Union has been a matter for disagreement and de-
bate since its establishment. This escalated with the increasing demands for 
representation from Irish Catholics, and to this day, the term ‘Unionist’ is 
understood by most Britons as referring to Protestant Northern Irish, who 
objected to any hint of  a transfer of  governmental functions to a regional 
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authority (devolution). Ironically, Ireland was the fi rst to have a true taste of  
freedom, with the establishment of  the Irish Free State in 1921, then inde-
pendence in 1937, and fi nally withdrawal from the British Commonwealth 
as the fully autonomous Irish Republic in 1949. Northern Ireland was also 
the fi rst part of  the UK to have its own political assembly, although Stor-
mont has had a chequered history, thanks to the civil war in the region, eu-
phemistically referred to as ‘The Troubles’.
The present debate therefore represents a bubbling up of  a perennial 
topic. It last surfaced signifi cantly during the late 1970s, when Scottish devo-
lution contributed to the defeat of  the Labour government, ushering in the 
rule of  Margaret Thatcher. Labour had promised a referendum on devolu-
tion, but endless debate ensued. Scottish MP Tam Dalyell was one of  many 
to voice an important objection: if  Scotland gained its own parliament, 
would its MPs at Westminster still be able to participate in the creation of  
legislation covering other parts of  the UK, and if  so, was this not unfair? 
On the other side of  the debate, Tom Nairn argued that the UK was inher-
ently unstable, and that for a person to attempt to maintain two identities, 
such as ‘Scottish’ and ‘British’, effectively constituted mental illness (Nairn 
1977). When it fi nally happened, the referendum was based on the condition 
that the votes of  40% of  eligible voters were required to secure a yes. In the 
event, a majority of  those who voted chose devolution, but as this was not 
40% of  those eligible, the bill failed.
The failure of  the referendum led to a sense in Scotland of  betrayal by
the Labour party. The defeat of  the Callaghan government, however, re-
sulted in an extended period in which Scotland had weakened political rep-
resentation: the staunchly Unionist Thatcher government had few Scottish 
MPs. This government refused to countenance any form of  devolution, and 
generated widespread popular resistance through the imposition of  such 
measures as the ‘Poll Tax’.1 In Scotland, especially, this popular resistance 
took on a nationalist character. It culminated in the 1995 Hollywood movie 
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Braveheart, which will be considered in more detail later in this paper.
One of  the consequences of  the Thatcher government’s refusal to 
countenance Scottish devolution was that it was left to Scots in Scotland 
to do the hard work themselves. Not only did Scotland come to its own 
sense of  national identity (however forged by blatantly absurd Hollywood 
movies), but in 1988 a Scottish Constitutional Convention was set up. This 
crossparty2 organization developed a framework for a Scottish Parliament 
that, following the landslide election victory for the Labour party in 1997, 
and the yes vote for devolution in the same year, formed the basis for what 
was actually implemented.
During the 90s, ‘the English question’ increasingly became a topic for 
books, newspapers and television debate. This intensifi ed in 1999, the year 
in which the Scottish Parliament was established. Just as the Scots had un-
dergone a sustained process of  self-discovery during the 80s and early 90s, 
the English now took their fi rst substantial steps along the same road. In-
evitably, it has been conducted under the shadow of  the parallel debate over 
the country’s participation, or otherwise, in the project of  the European 
Union (EU). To many, the questions are intimately intertwined: English na-
tional identity is directly threatened by increasing European political power 
over the country. Others point to the fl ourishing of  Irish national identity 
and, it has to be said, economic prosperity, accompanying the republic’s par-
ticipation in Europe.
National Identity
‘Identity’ is a term which deceives users into believing it is simple, when 
in fact it is highly complex, if  not ultimately elusive. The problem is com-
pounded by hitching it to another complex term ‘national’. Strictly speaking, 
a ‘nation’ refers to a group of  people, but there is considerable debate about 
the criteria by which nations are defi ned. In particular, since the 19th cen-
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tury, there has been confusion of  the concept of  ‘nation’ with that of  ‘state’ (a 
political entity), and an assumption that the two coincide. This assumption 
is expressed in the term ‘nation-state’ (Miscevic). In some cases, Japan be-
ing an example, there is a good fi t between a nation and a state. But in other 
cases there are problems: the Kurds, for example, constitute a nation, but 
they are not a state, instead living within the confi nes of  other states such 
as Iraq and Turkey. One can even contrast the multiple Chinese ‘states’ (the 
Peoples’ Republic and the National Republic ― Taiwan) with the ‘nation’ of  
the Chinese considered as a whole, including diaspora Chinese, though this 
is complicated by the various ethnicities that make up the all-encompassing 
label ‘Chinese’.
National identity is the identity of  a political community and refers to the 
kind of  community it is, its central values and commitments, its characteris-
tic ways of  talking about and conducting its collective affairs, its organising 
principles, and so forth. (Parekh 6)
There are two broad concepts of  ‘nationhood’. One can be defi ned as civic, 
referring to a group of  people who aspire to the creation of  a statelike orga-
nization. The other is ethnic: that is to say a group of  people who are united 
by some shared ancestry, tradition, language etc. (Miscevic) Parekh’s defi ni-
tion of  national identity, given above, is clearly broad enough to encompass 
both forms, though the same paper later emphasises that Parekh believes 
that, in order to minimise potential for division, the identity should not be 
based on ethnic considerations.
It should be evident from the background presented earlier that the UK 
is not a simple case. On the one hand, it is relatively easy to identify Scot-
land as a nation, according to most criteria of  nationhood, even though it 
is part of  the UK state. England is more problematic. Much of  the writing 
on the subject of  England has drawn attention to the way in which English 
nationalism was submerged beneath a ‘British’ identity, constructed largely 
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to support the Imperial project.
British imperialism became ‘the substitute English nationalism’, a cult of  
service in the British Empire which could be shared with the other nations 
of  Britain, especially the Scots. (Crick 92)
The Imperial British version of  national identity was constructed by the 
privileged classes who drove the Empire. We can therefore hypothesise 
that such a surrogate identity would be adopted less ‘naturally’ the further 
the recipient was, in terms of  geography, culture or class, from its creators. 
Since it was based on a southern English identity, it would have been rela-
tively easy for many of  the English to accept it as their own identity. On the 
other hard, for Scots, Welsh, Irish and even, perhaps, English Northerners, 
it would take the form of  an ‘additional’ identity.
When people say England, they sometimes mean Great Britain, sometimes 
the United Kingdom, sometimes the British Isles ― but never England. 
(Mikes 14)
George Mikes was a Hungarian, writing (humorously) about England in 
1946, and yet like many of  his observations this has the ring of  truth, and 
is supported by Kate Fox’s recently published anthropological study of  the 
English. ‘English’ characteristics were associated for many years with Brit-
ain, and this contributed to the identity confusion. For those who identifi ed 
closely with the Empire ― as inhabitants of  the UK were encouraged to (Ward 
15―18) ― a separate English identity was not only hard to fi nd, but hard to 
imagine a reason for.
The sense of  British identity did spread outside England, and it is in-
teresting to speculate on how and why. One likely reason is the undoubted 
unifying infl uence during the 20th century of  the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, an important propagator of  the top-down Imperial version 
of  national identity. By shaping a common public discourse, and explic-
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itly identifying all viewers and listeners as British, the BBC was an important 
propaganda tool. Its role is even more explicit when the BBC World Service 
is taken into account, as a representation of  ‘Britain’ to the outside world. 
Another likely reason for the acceptance of  the ‘British’ identity comes from 
shared experience during wartime. In the First and especially the Second 
World Wars, British soldiers mingled with comrades from all walks of  life, 
classes and backgrounds. The common cause provided them with a means 
of  transcending cultural difference. This shared sense of  Britishness is ex-
tremely strong in the generation that fought in the Second World War, and 
has been passed on, though obviously in increasingly diluted form, to suc-
cessive generations.
A related facet of  the identity issue is that the overwhelming major-
ity, 97%, of  Britain’s ‘visible minority’ live in England (Lee 4). In many cases,
members of  these minorities fi nd it easier to identify with ‘Britain’ rather 
than ‘England’ (see, for example, Marr 156―158, as well as Alibhai-Brown).
The current Labour government’s contribution to the situation has been to 
follow the US precedent in encouraging members of  ethnic minorities to 
view themselves as ‘hyphenated’: as Black-British or Mexican-British, for ex-
ample (Rumbelow). Although the strategy was suggested as a means of  ac-
cepting diversity within an overarching British identity, it was received with 
almost universal criticism.
Returning to the two broad types of  nationalism, we can see that the 
Irish, the Scots, and to a certain extent the Welsh, preserved a sense of  
national identity based on ethnic closeness. This drew on shared ancestry, 
shared language (although both Scots Gaelic and Welsh are minority lan-
guages) and a sense of  tradition. Much of  the tradition can be argued to 
be artifi cial and constructed. For example, Scots identity is invested in 
symbols such as the kilt and the clan tartan, even though there is evidence 
that these have nothing like the history claimed for them (Paxman 13).3 A 
powerful contributor to Scots sense of  national identity was Mel Gibson’s 
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fi lm Braveheart, a ridiculous Hollywood confection which showed the usual 
fl agrant disregard for history. Nevertheless, it told the story in a suffi ciently 
compelling manner that, far from being offended by a portrayal of  Scots 
as woad-daubed Picts from 800 years earlier, many Scots were infused with 
enthusiasm for devolution. Along the way, hatred of  the English was fanned 
as well. Hollywood rarely shows any compunction about exacerbating ethnic 
tensions.
It is more diffi cult for England to develop a sense of  national identity in 
these terms. The nation is more heterogeneous, and because of  its history, 
this was true even before the immigration of  the 20th century. It cannot 
develop an identity based on language, as its language has been appropriated 
by the world. And as noted earlier, its traditions are mostly British Imperial 
traditions. Many modern English seem to be embarrassed by their nation’s 
history. Kate Fox, in Watching The English, describes how the English get 
embarrassed extremely easily. Moreover, the ‘image’ of  England most often 
presented is a bucolic vision unrecognisable to the country’s population 
(see Paxman 141―144, Marr 99―121). One reason why this may be the case 
is that England’s existence as an independent nation outside the Imperial 
British framework dates from the pre-industrial, pre-Act of  Union period 
of  agrarianism. Thus this forms the dominant image of  the country, when 
considered on its own. It does not help that the English have a tendency to 
preserve and even idolise the past, embarrassment notwithstanding.
England has no Braveheart around which to rally. Moreover, the English 
are overwhelmingly portrayed as villains in Hollywood movies (one excep-
tion being James Bond, which hardly constitutes a cultural icon around 
which a national identity can be built). The dominant images of  the domes-
tic fi lm industry tend to be gritty, relatively realistic, portrayals, frequently 
of  industrial decay, though shot through with characteristic humour: see, 
for example, The Full Monty, Brassed Off, Billy Elliot. Recently there has been 
a strain of  light comedy, exemplifi ed by Four Weddings and a Funeral, Notting 
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Hill and Love Actually, though this is as resolutely Southern and middle class 
as the former three fi lms are Northern and working class.
Thus, images of  England that do exist are also often unsatisfactory be-
cause of  their association with the South of  the country to the exclusion of  
the North.
The two parts of  England are not just different, they are opposites. The 
South represents the English, the North the Unenglish. The North is the 
‘Other’ that defi nes its own nationalism! (Taylor 142, 147)
This lack could be seen as an opportunity. One criticism levelled at Scots na-
tionalism, for example, is its ethnic exclusivity (Alibhai-Brown). While there 
are tendencies towards this attitude in England they are, at present, associ-
ated with overtly racist, extreme right-wing political movements. This limits 
their acceptability to the nation as a whole. Lee sees the overall absence of  
this sort of  national identity as an opportunity to develop a genuinely civic 
form of  nationalism. In a sense, British nationalism was civic, its major dis-
advantage being its imposition by a privileged elite. Lee argues for the devel-
opment of  a civic form of  English nationalism, one determined more by a 
choice of  the body politic to adhere to the nation’s values, rather than united 
by inescapable accidents of  birth, whether based on ethnicity, class or place 
of  birth. This point of  view seems to be spreading. The notion that identity 
was shifting from being an ineluctable consequence of  birth, to a matter of  
choice, was also advanced at a conference discussion on the political fracture 
of  the UK (see note 4).
Fracture
Devolution for Scotland and Wales represents a signifi cant change to the 
structure of  the UK. For many commentators, it is evidence supporting the 
proposition that the UK (and indeed any multicultural entity) is inherently un-
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stable, and in the process of  breaking up. A claim of  ‘inherent’ instability is, 
of  course, rather arguable. Since the UK as a political entity has effectively 
lasted nearly 300 years, longer than most nation-states, one is forced to won-
der whether the instability of  a multicultural state is necessarily any greater 
than the ‘inherent’ instability of  any state. Nevertheless, contemporary world 
events do offer a depressing array of  examples of  composite states break-
ing apart, ranging from the former Yugoslavia to imminent civil war in Iraq. 
What is required is a thorough objective analysis of  the break-up of  states, 
to determine whether this prima facie evidence does represent a statistically 
signifi cant tendency.
One problem with attempting such analysis is identifying what consti-
tutes ‘multicultural’. As noted earlier, England itself  was from the start a 
composite entity, formed from a diversity of  groups. There was no single 
shared language, although the Angles, Saxons and Jutes did speak mutu-
ally intelligible versions of  the tongue now known as Old English (Wilton). 
These mixed with Celtic and Viking languages, and, after the Norman 
Conquest from 1066, Norman French and Latin. The English nation came 
about as a result of  the specifi c military and political ambitions of  the rulers 
of  Wessex. In effect, Wales and Scotland gained their own identities because 
when the kings of  Wessex described the area over which they claimed over-
lordship (and which they named England), they happened to draw certain 
lines on the map. It is only a result of  this military realpolitik that Cornwall, a 
Celtic region with its own language and just as great a claim to autonomy as 
Wales, happened to be located within England.
Fox argues that there is a distinctive English culture, at least in terms of  
behaviour. Her study was partly prompted by a set of  books that claimed 
that English culture was disappearing, swamped by a ‘global’, American cul-
ture. It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which this commonality 
of  culture within England is the product of  political union. In all the discus-
sion of  different types of  nationalism it is easy to forget that these factors 
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are highly interrelated. Nevertheless, the culture Fox identifi es does not re-
ally form the basis of  a national identity, as its main characteristics are social 
ineptitude, humour, politeness and hypocrisy!
The opening of  the new Scottish parliament in 1999 coincided with a 
wave of  books suggesting the break-up of  the Union was imminent. The 
fi rst three signifi cant entries were, unsurprisingly, by right-wingers, as the 
Conservative party has always been associated with the Unionist cause. Jour-
nalists Peter Hitchens and Simon Heffer, and Conservative politician John 
Redwood, made the connection between Scottish devolution, the project of  
European integration, and New Labour’s reinvention of  the British political 
system. Heffer proposed a resurgent, newly proud English nation, free of  
European control, as the only appropriate response.
In 2000, historian Norman Davies also made the connection with Eu-
rope, albeit from a more sympathetic perspective than the rightwingers, yet 
suggested that ‘the breakup of  the United Kingdom’ was imminent. This 
was closely followed by BBC political correspondent Andrew Marr’s attempt 
to identify The Day Britain Died. The same year, Scottish nationalist Tom 
Nairn returned to the theme of  his 1977 work. The idea has penetrated Brit-
ish consciousness so deeply that a participant in a convention panel on the 
topic could open the discussion with the comment ‘The UK is dead’.4
In the case of  the UK, however, for all the warnings of  doom, the cof-
fi n of  the state has yet to be lowered into the ground. Both the New La-
bour and Conservative parties appear committed to the maintenance of  the 
Union. Marr sees the establishment of  the Scottish Parliament and Welsh 
Assembly as moves designed to keep the Union intact, allowing a measure 
of  independence to head-off  those pressing for full autonomy.
A 1997 poll asking Scottish people whether they felt they were Scottish 
or British is often presented as evidence of  the demise of  British conscious-
ness in Scotland (see for example the Scotland and Devolution web page). 
The poll’s results were as follows:
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・Belief  that they were Scottish ― 28%
・Belief  that they were more Scottish than British ― 35%
・Belief  that they were equally British and Scottish ― 29%
・Belief  that they were more British than Scottish ― 3%
・Belief  that they were British and not Scottish ― 3%
・No thoughts on the issue ― 2%
(Scotland and Devolution)
Polls and statistics of  this kind must always be approached with care, how-
ever. The website reporting these results immediately prejudices the issue by 
claiming that the question was whether respondents felt Scottish or British. 
This echoes Tom Nairn’s belief  that a healthy mind cannot conceivably be 
both. The results are summarised: ‘Therefore 63% indicated that they felt 
that they were Scottish or more Scottish than British.’ (Scotland and De-
volution) Yet, perhaps more signifi cantly, the results indicate that 70% of  
respondents considered themselves British, and more remarkably, 35% con-
sidered their Britishness at least as important as their Scottishness.
While there are certainly powerful forces testing the bonds of  Union, it 
is also undeniable that those bonds still remain. A salutary lesson for both 
major political parties would be to realise that it is the consciousness of  in-
dividual citizens which seems to be the deciding factor. Unfortunately while 
both New Labour and the Conservative party want to maintain Britain, the 
emphasis continues to be on the top-down imposition of  a centralising, to-
talising vision. The Conservatives’ New Britain is a fossilised ‘heritage’ ver-
sion, in which the core values of  the nation are ‘our individualism and spirit 
of  enterprise, our social mobility and our loyalty to local institutions’ (Hague), 
and its symbols are ‘Buckingham Palace, the Changing of  the Guard, [and]
the Houses of  Parliament’ (Willetts). Meanwhile New Labour’s vision is of  
the much-derided ‘cool Britannia’. Lee argues that New Labour’s ‘rebranding’ 
of  Britain was actually the imposition of  the ‘dynamic’ image of  London 
identity on the whole nation, explaining why it failed to be taken up by the 
people of  Britain (12―13).
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It is unlikely that the near future will see further signifi cant weakening
of  the Union. For this to happen, England will have had to fi nd a viable na-
tional identity, and achieve some form of  political organisation beyond the 
UK parliament at Westminster. Vernon Bogdanor and Andrew Marr both 
suggest federalism as a solution. They argue that it is a means of  reorganis-
ing the structure of  the UK without losing the historic links between the 
nations. But it is hard to see how this could work equitably, with England 
being so overwhelmingly large in comparison with its neighbours that most 
of  the current tensions would remain, albeit in altered form. Perhaps the fu-
ture of  the UK actually lies outside its borders. The EU, like the UK, faces a 
constitutional crisis, and the two are interwoven. Many of  those who oppose 
a weakening of  the Union are also fi ercely resistant to integrating the UK
further into Europe, especially in a federal structure. But if  the EU does re-
sume its move towards closer integration it is hard to see how the UK could 
hope to survive on the outside.
In any case, the EU also demonstrates clearly that, for many people, the 
notion of  multiple national loyalties is not as problematic as its critics hold. 
One problem with the approach espoused by Tom Nairn is that it appears 
to defi ne nationalism in an exclusive way. To Nairn, humans are only capable 
of  one loyalty in any category, and to attempt to hold, say, multiple politi-
cal loyalties is a recipe for madness. Like many such exclusivist analyses, this 
falls apart when the issue is decentred. Those at the margins of  the world’s 
states, or those who dwell in the more complex nations of  the world, are 
accustomed to defi ning their identities in terms of  multiple referents, and 
to being loyal to a variety of  entities, different in various ways (whether hi-
erarchical, as in London: England: UK: EU, or separate, as in the holder of  
dual citizenship). These multidimensional identities do not cause signifi cant 
problems, except in the case of  direct confl ict between two of  the entities.
Are those who believe that only one national identity is possible there-
fore arguing that we should base our concept of  identity not on humanity in 
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a state of  peace, but humanity in a state of  war?
Conclusion
When a country is racked by civil war, or torn apart by other forms of  di-
visive politics, it is easy to blame the events on differences in culture. It is a 
convenient ‘off-the-shelf ’ solution, which saves having to examine causes 
with a little more depth and perceptiveness. It has become fashionable in 
recent years to regard the ‘melting pot’ (an idea associated with the US, but 
which could equally well apply to any country with a culturally heteroge-
neous population) as a failed experiment. Such an attitude simply betrays the 
old wine of  traditional insular ethnic prejudices concealed in new bottles. 
While the US itself  has no shortage of  tensions between different groups, 
these are as much the tensions of  an increasing poverty gap, and an exag-
geration of  political differences between left and right, as they are of  ethnic-
ity and culture.
Those who choose to consider recent changes in the structure of  the 
UK as evidence of  the inherent instability of  composite political forms 
might be wise to refl ect on the fact that this ‘inherently unstable’ composite 
has so far lasted 300 years. Even the opinion poll results which are used as 
evidence of  fracture can show the opposite. The ‘British’ national identity, 
despite being a device used by an English elite to mould a population to the 
purposes of  Empire, has nevertheless been taken up by a large proportion 
of  that population as a ‘natural’ identity.
The UK has changed signifi cantly, and it is inevitable that more change 
will come. The key to positive change in the immediate future is the forging 
of  a new identity and political system for the English nation. At present, the 
solutions of  the major parties are clearly too centralising and reactionary to 
be of  use. However, commentators continue to suggest imaginative alterna-
tives.
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Notes
1 The Community Charge was a local tax strongly supported by Thatcher, introduced 
to replace the rates levied by councils. As it was a fl at fee rather than the rates’ 
property-based tax, it was perceived as shifting the tax burden from the rich to the 
poor. It was especially unpopular in Scotland because it was introduced in 1989, a 
year earlier than in England.
2 The Conservative Party was never involved, and the Scottish National Party quickly 
withdrew.
3 For purposes of  comparison, it is interesting to note the recent promotion of  an 
‘Ulster Scots’ language in Northern Ireland. While this is connected with a need to 
establish identity at a time of  fracture, it has also been suggested that such engi-
neered culture is a means of  extracting fi nancial grants from the government.
4 Ian McDonald at ‘Fractured: Is British Politics too Broken to Stay Together’ at In-
teraction, the 63rd World Science Fiction Convention, Glasgow, 6th August 2005.
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